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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON PETTTION FOR REHEARING 
The sole issue presented in this petition for rehearing 
is whether the Court overlooked a material issue pertaining to 
proposed remedial measures to be taken on remand of this case to 
ensure both parties a fair trial or fair capital sentencing 
proqeedingsr to wit: recusal of the Honorable J. Harlan Burns 
from all further proceedings on this case. 
-iii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaint i f f -Respondent , : 
v . . 
DOUGLAS EDWARD KAY, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
Case No. 20265 
Pr ior i ty No. 1 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by 
this Court on March 7, 1986, in an interlocutory appeal in a 
capital case from an order of the district judge vacating the 
condition of conditional guilty pleas which had previously been 
unilaterally presented to the district judge by the defense and 
which had been accepted and entered by the court. The terms of 
the pleas were that the defendant would plead guilty to all 
charges including three counts of first degree murder and four 
counts of aggravated robbery upon the condition that he would not 
receive the death penalty on the capital murder charges (R. II, 
159). 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
For purposes of addressing the narrow issue presented 
in this petition for rehearing, the State agrees with the fact 
statements set forth in the Courtfs opinion in State v. Kay, 
P.2d , No. 20265, slip op. (Otah, filed March 7, 1986) 
(attached as Appendix A). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Court's opinion in State v . Kay. p.2d , 
No. 20265, s l i p op, (Utah, f i l e d March 7 , 1986) , does not address 
an issue raised by the State, the resolution of which i s 
essent ia l to ensure the defendant's and the State 1s rights to 
fain proceedings upon remand of th is case for further 
proceedings, and to restore public confidence in those 
proceedings. The State contended in i t s i n i t i a l brief on appeal 
that if th i s Court affirmed the lower court1s order vacating the 
condition of defendant's guilty pleas, then the remedial rel ief 
of directing that a new judge hear a l l future proceedings on th i s 
case was necessary to ensure the fairness of those proceedings 
for a l l parties and restore public confidence in them. This 
Court has now affirmed the lower court's order; has held that the 
t r i a l judge violated the procedural requirements of Rule 11 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure when he entertained and 
accepted the defendant's unilateral plea (a rule aimed, in part, 
at preserving the integrity of the judicial process); and has 
ordered the case remanded for further proceedings. However, the 
Court has not addressed the question of recusal of the tr ia l 
judge. Resolution of th i s issue i s necessary for a complete and 
proper disposit ion of th is case. 
TNTRQDDOTION 
Rule 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, alludes 
to grounds for rehearing as follows: 
The petition shall state with particu-
larity the points of law or fact which the 
petitioner claims the Court has overlooked 
or misapprehended. . . . 
-2-
In Brown Y. PlCkardr denying reh'g. 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 
512 (1886), this Court elaborated on the standard for rehearing: 
We must be convinced that the court failed 
to consider some material point in the case/ 
or that it erred in its conclusions, or 
that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of the hearing. 
.(em^asis added) 4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 (citation omitted). 
in Cummings v. Nielson. 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913) , the Court 
stated: 
[A] rehearing should not be applied for, 
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or have over-
looked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based 
the decision on some wrong principle of law, 
or have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result 
. . . . If there are some reasons, however, 
such as we have indicated above, or other 
good reasons, a petition for a rehearing 
should be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624. The argument portion of this 
brief will demonstrate that the Court overlooked a material point 
in its decision which warrants the granting of the State1s 
petition for rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT OVERLOOKED A MATERIAL ISSUE 
ON THIS APPEAL WHEN IT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE, 
ADDRESS AND RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER 
ALL FUTURE PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE SHOULD 
BE HEARD BY A NEW JUDGE TO ENSURE FAIRNESS 
TO ALL PARTIES AND RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 
IN THE PROCEEDINGS. 
In the initial briefing of this case, the State 
asserted that should this Court affirm the lower court's order 
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(which vacated the condition of defendant's guilty pleas and 
allowed defendant to either stand on his guilty pleas without 
the condition or withdraw his guilty pleas and proceed to t r i a l ) , 
then certain remedial measures would be necessary to ensure the 
defendant a fa ir t r ia l or the State a fa ir capital sentencing 
proceeding, and to restore public confidence in the proceedings. 
Recusal of the t r ia l judge from a l l future proceedings was 
asserted as being essent ia l to a proper disposit ion of this case. 
(Respondent's brief, Point IC at pp. 34-39, reprinted as Appendix 
B below)•1 
The Court has now affirmed the lower court's order. 
In doing so f the Court found error when defense counsel proposed 
a plea bargain to the t r ia l court without f i r s t obtaining the 
State 's consentf concluding that: 
Under Rule 11 [Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure], the plea should not have been 
tendered to the judge unless the State had 
previously agreed to its terms. On the 
record before us, there is no evidence that 
the prosecutor at any time expressly agreed 
to the terms of the pleaf much less that 
he agreed to the plea prior to its presenta-
tion to the judge. 
State v. Kay, P.2d , No. 20265f slip op. at 16 (Utah, 
filed March 7, 1986). The Court also expressly held that the 
1
 The State also requested that th i s Court order the remedial 
measure of precluding the State from using the defendant's 
confession (given during the proceedings when the t r ia l judge 
accepted defendant's conditional guilty plea) at any subsequent 
t r ia l to preserve defendant's due process rights should he choose 
to withdraw his gui l ty pleas and proceed to t r i a l . (Respondent's 
brief, Point IIB at 46) . This Court agreed and adopted th i s 
remedial measure in i t s decision. £ayr s l i p op. at 17-18. 
However, the Court has fa i led to address the additional measure 
of the t r i a l judge's recusal. 
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t r i a l judge v i o l a t e d the procedural requirements of Rule 11 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure when he enterta ined and 
accepted the defendant's un i la tera l p lea . Kay, s l i p op. at 2 , 16 
(Otah, f i l e d March 7 1986) . This Court concluded that : 
The t r i a l court a l so erred by e n t e r t a i n -
ing the p lea . After the motion t o enter a 
plea was presented to i t f and before proceeding 
with the i n camera hearing, the court should 
have ascertained whether the prosecutor had 
agreed t o the proposed p lea . If i t determined 
that the prosecutor had not agreed in advance, 
the court should have terminated the hearing 
and any further considerat ion of the p lea . 
Kay, s l i p op. at 16. 
The above errors of the defense and the t r i a l judge 
were found to be c lear v i o l a t i o n s of Rule 11 . This Court 
recognized that Rule 11 i s aimed, in part , at preserving the 
i n t e g r i t y of the j u d i c i a l process , that i t de l inea te s proper 
standards of conduct for t r i a l courts in connection with plea 
bargaining, and that i t bars the t r i a l court 1 s par t i c ipa t ion in 
plea d i s cuss ions prior to any agreement being made by the 
prosecuting attorney because such par t i c ipa t ion may undermine the 
judge ' s proper function as a neutral arbiter and transform him 
into an advocate for whatever proposed reso lut ion the judge 
favors . ILax, s l i p op. at 6 -7 . 
Because t h i s Court has found a c lear v i o l a t i o n of Rule 
11 by the t r i a l judge, a l l of the grounds for recusal asserted at 
pages 34-39 of the S t a t e 1 s i n i t i a l brief (Appendix B of t h i s 
br ie f ) remain v i a b l e , are hereby r e - a s s e r t e d , and should be 
addressed by t h i s Court. £££ also the S t a t e 1 s Appl icat ion for 
Order of Recusal and Change of Judge and Memorandum in Support 
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thereof (R. Ill, at 29-53). The remedial measure of recusal is 
essential to ensure the fairness of future proceedings for all 
parties regardless of whether the case proceeds directly to a 
capital sentencing proceeding (should defendant choose to stand 
on his guilty plea), or proceeds to trial where the defendant may 
choqTse trial by judge or jury, and if convicted, further choose a 
capital sentencing hearing by judge or jury* Such remedial 
relief is also essential to restore public confidence in the 
proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing. Respondent submits this Court 
has not considered a material point in this case by not 
acknowledging, addressing or attempting to resolve the question 
of whether all future proceedings should be heard by a new trial 
judge. Respondent requests that the Court's opinion be 
supplemented and modified accordingly. 
The State certifies that this petition is presented in 
good faith, for the reasons set out herein, and not for purposes 
of delay. 
DATED this «?P day of March, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
-6-
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, No. 20265 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
•:
 F J L £ D 
v. March 7, 1986 
Douglas Edward Kay, 
Defendant and Appellant. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendant Douglas Kay appeals from the trial court's 
refusal to adhere to the terms of a plea bargain. He pleaded 
guilty to three counts of capital homicide in exchange for a 
promise that he would be sentenced to life imprisonment 
rather than death. The trial court accepted the pleas 
without objection from the State. Two weeks later, following 
a change in the State's position, the court ruled that it was 
not bound by the agreement to impose life imprisonment. The 
court gave Kay the option of being sentenced, with the possi-
bility of receiving the death sentence, or withdrawing his 
guilty pleas. Kay took an interlocutory appeal and seeks 
specific enforcement of the plea bargain. He alleges not 
only that principles of double jeopardy preclude the court 
from setting the pleas aside and forcing him to begin the 
process anew, but also that the trial court's actions 
violated his constitutional right to due process. For 
reasons unique to the facts of this case, we find no 
constitutional infirmity in the trial court's setting aside 
the condition of the pleas. The case therefore is remanded. 
Kay may withdraw his pleas of guilty or he may proceed to 
sentencing. 
This appeal presents several issues. The first is 
whether the Utah statute governing the sentencing of capital 
felons, U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-207 (Repl. Vol. 8B, 1978, & 
Supp. 1985), permits a defendant to plead guilty to a capital 
felony in exchange for a promise of life imprisonment. The 
second issue is whether a violation of Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-11 (Repl. 
Vol. 8C, 1982, Supp. 1985)—either because of the trial 
judge's participation in the plea process or because the plea 
was conditional in nature—requires the plea to be set aside. 
The third issue is whether the acceptance of a plea agreement 
that is subsequently broken places a defendant in jeopardy 
and precludes trial. Finally, we must determine what con-
straints due process places on the State when it seeks to 
breach a plea agreement. 
We hold that neither the statute governing the 
sentencing of capital felons nor Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure prevented Kay from entering and the trial 
judge from accepting the conditional plea presented here. We 
hold that the trial judge did violate the procedural require-
ments of Rule 11 when he accepted Kay's unilateral plea, but 
find that the violation did not render the plea agreement 
invalid. We also hold that while Kay was placed in jeopardy 
within the meaning of the fifth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, the trial judge was entitled to rescind his 
acceptance of the agreement under the circumstances of this 
case, and neither double jeopardy nor due process considera-
tions bar the State from proceeding to trial. 
The facts leading up to this appeal are relatively 
simple. Kay is charged with three counts of first degree 
murder, all capital felonies, and four counts of aggravated 
robbery, all first degree felonies. These charges arose out 
of the execution-style shooting deaths of three people during 
the robbery of a bar in Cedar City, Utah, in February of 
1984.* Kay was arraigned on April 17, 1984, and again on 
May 8th. A number of pretrial motions were presented through-
out the summer. The trial was originally scheduled for 
August 13, 1984, but at the State's request, was continued 
until September 17th. 
Three weeks before trial, defendant's counsel 
presented the court with an "In-Camera Motion for Conditional 
Plea of Guilty" in which Kay offered to plead guilty to all 
counts and to give his confession in open court in exchange 
for a promise by the judge that he would not be sentenced to 
death. Although the State had two days' notice that Kay 
intended to enter a conditional plea, it was unaware of the 
terms of the proposed plea until the motion was presented to 
the court. 
The motion was presented to the court in chambers 
and was discussed at length off the record. The judge, 
defendant's counsel, the Iron County attorney, and a Utah 
assistant attorney general were all present. A one-hour 
recess was then called to allow the State to consider the 
matter and to allow defense counsel to consult with Kay. 
Following another brief in camera session with all counsel, 
proceedings were held on the record. The court questioned 
Tl Three other defendants were involved in the robbery. The 
State granted immunity to two of them in exchange for their 
testimony against Kay and the remaining defendant. 
No. 20265- 2 
Kay at length about his understanding of both the plea agree-
ment and its consequences and concluded that the pleas were 
knowingly and voluntarily given. Kay then pleaded guilty to 
each count of capital homicide "on the condition that [his] 
life not be forfeited,* pleaded guilty to all four counts of 
aggravated robbery, and gave a full confession on the record, 
describing the robbery and the murders in detail. The trial 
judge accepted the pleas and scheduled a sentencing hearing 
for September 17, 1984. At no time did the prosecution 
object in open court to the pleas or to any other aspect of 
the proceedings. 
Two weeks later, the State asked the trial court to 
reconsider its acceptance of the conditional pleas. This 
motion was made after a new lawyer appeared as lead counsel 
for the State, after the details of Kay's confession had been 
widely reported in the media, and after several public 
demonstrations in Cedar City had protested the agreement to 
sentence Kay to life imprisonment. One such incident involved 
parading an effigy of Kay crowned with the head of a dead pig 
through the town with a placard calling for the recall of the 
trial judge in the upcoming elections. 
Following a lengthy hearing on the State's motion to 
reconsider, the trial judge entered an order vacating the 
promise of life imprisonment. He gave several reasons for 
his action. First, he found that the State had been surprised 
by the original motion for the conditional guilty plea, had 
disagreed with the plea agreement (despite its failure to 
object on the record), and had not had sufficient time to 
respond to Kay's request for a conditional plea. In addi-
tion, he found that the conditional plea was illegal and that 
accepting it would constitute plain error. The trial judge 
gave Kay the option of standing on the guilty pleas and facing 
a sentencing proceeding at which the death penalty might be 
imposed; withdrawing the guilty pleas, reinstating the not 
guilty pleas, and going to trial; or pursuing an interlocutory 
appeal. Kay chose the last alternative. 
In this Court, Kay seeks specific enforcement of 
the plea agreement. Kay asserts that the trial court did not 
exceed its authority in accepting the pleas and that, in any 
event, the State's failure to timely object precludes it from 
challenging them now. He argues that the trial court's 
actions violated his constitutional right not to be placed 
twice in jeopardy, as well as his due process right to a 
fair, speedyf and public trial. 
The State contends that the trial judge properly 
vacated the promise of life imprisonment because conditional 
and unilateral pleas are unlawful and therefore void under 
both the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and the death 
penalty statute. In response to Kay's constitutional 
3 No. 20265 
arguments, the State asserts that because the conditional 
pleas were void, Kay was not placed in jeopardy. In addition, 
the State argues that because Kay acted improperly in offering 
the guilty pleas, he cannot now complain that the resulting 
publicity and delay deny him due process. 
I 
We first consider Utah's death penalty statute to 
determine whether it permits a trial judge to accept a guilty 
plea conditioned upon the judge's promise not to impose the 
death penalty. In capital cases, trials are bifurcated: the 
defendant's guilt or innocence is determined in the first 
phase, while the penalty of death or life imprisonment is 
determined in the second. U.C.A., 1953, §§ 76-3-206 and -207 
(Repl. Vol. 8B, 1978, & Supp. 1985). 
This bifurcated scheme was adopted by Utah in 1973 
in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman held that the 
death penalty was prohibited by the cruel and unusual punish-
ment provisions of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to 
the United States Constitution when the decision to impose 
the penalty was left to the "uncontrolled discretion of 
judges or juries." 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
Following Furman, the Georgia legislature amended its death 
penalty statute, bifurcating the guilt and penalty phases and 
specifying detailed standards to guide the fact finder in 
deciding between death and life imprisonment in the penalty 
phase. The Supreme Court reviewed this amended statute and 
held that it was not per se unconstitutional. Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976). The Georgia statute 
upheld in Gregg is essentially identical to Utah's death 
penalty statute, which we have also upheld against constitu-
tional challenge. State v. Pierre, Utah, 572 P.2d 1338, 1345 
(1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978). 
As enacted in 1973, Utah's death penalty statute 
required a separate sentencing proceeding only for capital 
felons found guilty after trial. In 1983, however, the 
legislature amended the law to require a separate sentencing 
proceeding for those who plead guilty, as well as for those 
who are convicted by a judge or jury after trial. 1983 Utah 
Laws, ch. 19, § 1; U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-207(1) (Repl. Vol. 8B, 
1978, Supp. 1985). No legislative history exists to explain 
this change. 
The language of the sentencing statute, section 
76-3-207, provides as follows: 
(1) When a defendant has pled guilty 
to or been found guilty of a capital 
felony, there shall be further proceedings 
No. 20265 4 
before the court or jury on the issue of 
sentence. . . . 
(2) In these sentencing proceedings, 
evidence may be presented as to any matter 
the court deems relevant to sentence, 
including but not limited to the nature 
and cirexamstances of the crime, the 
defendant's character, background, 
history, mental and physical condition, 
and any other facts in aggravation or 
mitigation of the penalty. 
(3) [Thereafter, t]he court or jury, 
as the case may be, shall retire to 
consider the penalty. . . . 
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-207(1), (2), and (3) (Repl. Vol. 8Bf 
1978, Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). Arguably, this mandate 
of a hearing requiring consideration of the evidence to deter-
mine the proper sentence is meaningless if the judge can bind 
himself in advance to impose a particular sentence. There-
fore,, the State argues, we should construe the statute to 
preclude the judge from accepting any plea that would limit 
his discretion in the sentencing proceeding. This argument 
is without merit. 
The bifurcated sentencing procedure was instituted 
to insure that if a defendant is found guilty and then 
sentenced to death, the sentence will withstand scrutiny 
under both the state and federal constitutions. See 
generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The 
statute's aim was to eliminate the arbitrariness of the 
decision to impose death. It did this by requiring the court 
or the jury to carefully weigh specific aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances before deciding upon the appropriate 
sentence. Id. We can infer that the legislature requires 
the bifurcated proceeding for those who plead guilty to 
capital crimes in order to assure that if the death sentence 
is imposed, it is no more arbitrary than a death sentence 
imposed after a full trial. 
Arguably, allowing the judge to agree to forego the 
death penalty without first considering the kind of detailed 
information normally presented at a sentencing proceeding 
renders the sentencing scheme unconstitutionally arbitrary. 
This argument is not persuasive. Some discretion is always 
present in the operation of a death penalty statute. The 
prosecution always has discretion to decide whom to charge 
with a capital felony. It may also bargain that charge down 
to a lesser offense, even after the charge is filed. 
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Similarly, under our sentencing statute, nothing prevents a 
prosecutor from refusing to put on evidence of aggravating 
circumstances, thus effectively insuring that a defendant 
will not receive the death penalty.2 U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 76-3-207(2) (Repl. Vol. 8B, 1978, Supp. 1985). 
Under these circumstances, permitting the trial 
judge to accept a guilty plea conditioned upon an agreement 
not to impose the death penalty does not significantly 
increase the potential for arbitrariness in administering the 
death sentence. It does not therefore raise questions of a 
constitutional magnitude under Furman v. Georgia, supra. 
Although a sentencing hearing must be held, nothing in the 
sentencing statute precludes the trial court from agreeing in 
advance, under the terms of a proper plea agreement, to 
impose a particular sentence. In light of these consider-
ations, we find that the statute provides no basis for 
upholding the trial court's subsequent withdrawal from the 
agreement. 
II 
The State next argues that the trial court's failure 
to comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
renders Kay's bargain invalid. U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-11 
(Repl. Vol. 8C, 1982, Supp. 1985). Our Rule 11 is closely 
patterned after Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure as that rule existed when the Utah rules were first 
formulated. The primary purpose of the federal rule and, we 
must assume, the comparable state rule, is to insure that 
when a defendant enters a guilty plea and thereby waives 
important constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury 
trial, he or she acts freely and voluntarily, with full 
knowledge of the consequences of the plea. E.g., McCarthy 
v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969). To this end, 
subpart (a) of Utah's Rule 11 provides that a defendant shall 
be represented by counsel before a plea is taken, unless coun-
sel is waived, and subparts (b), (c), and (e) describe in 
detail the procedures for taking pleas of guilty or no 
contest. 
A second purpose of Rule 11, aimed at preserving the 
integrity of the judicial process, is to insure that the 
record reflects that the plea was properly taken, i.e., that 
the judge correctly determined the terms of the plea agreement 
and whether the plea was voluntary. See, e.g., United Stages 
v. Roberts, 570 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Thus, the rul^ 
delineates proper standards of conduct for trial courts in 
connection with plea bargaining, requiring them to determine 
T. In some states, prosecutors are statutorily required to 
introduce evidence of aggravating circumstances. See, e.g., 
N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3(d)(1982 ed.). 
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whether a plea agreement has been reached between the defen-
dant and the prosecution and, if so, the details of that 
agreement. U.C.A., 1953# § 77-35-ll(e)(6) (Repl. Vol. 8C, 
1982, Supp. 1985). In addition, the court must inform the 
defendant that it is not bound by the prosecutor's agreement 
to request or recommend a specific sentence. Id. Finally, 
Rule 11 bars the trial court's participation in plea discus-
sions "prior to any agreement being made by the prosecuting 
attorney." The rule provides, however, that after such an 
agreement is reached, the plea may be disclosed to the court, 
which may then indicate to both parties whether the proposed 
disposition will be approved. U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-ll(f) 
(Repl. Vol. 8C, 1982, Supp. 1985). That portion of the rule 
also provides that if the trial court thereafter decides not 
to adhere to the terms of the agreement, it shall so advise 
the defendant and allow the defendant to either affirm or 
withdraw the plea.3 These provisions governing the trial 
court's conduct attempt to insure that the trial court will 
not improperly participate in the plea negotiations, the 
possible consequence of such participation being to render 
the plea involuntary and subject to subsequent attack. 
United States v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 
1966). Such participation may also undermine the judge's 
proper function as a neutral arbiter and transform him into 
an advocate for whatever proposed resolution the judge favors. 
United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 203 (2d Cir. 1976), 
cert, denied, 429 U.S. 926 (1976). 
Understanding these general principles is useful in 
evaluating the State's contention that the trial court's 
violation of Rule 11 renders Kay's plea invalid. The State 
argues that the trial court violated Rule 11 in two 
particulars. First, the State contends that because Rule 11 
T". This provision in the Utah rules differs from Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in that the Utah rule 
suggests that the trial court can withdraw from the plea 
agreement even after a guilty plea has been formally accepted 
and entered on the record. The federal rule, on the other 
hand, permits a court to accept or reject a plea that is 
conditioned upon an agreement as to a particular sentence. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3). If the court rejects the agree-
ment, it must allow the defendant to withdraw the plea; if it 
accepts the agreement, it is generally bound to adhere to the 
terms of the agreement. United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 
1325, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The federal rule does not allow 
a judge carte blanche authority to renege on a plea agreement 
after the agreement has been accepted. Id. This power, 
apparently granted by the Utah rule, to withdraw from a plea 
agreement at any time should not be taken literally. In 
appropriate circumstances, due process and double jeopardy 
considerations will prohibit the judge from reneging on the 
agreement. See discussion in part III infra. 
expressly allows a defendant only to enter a plea of "not 
guilty, guilty or no contest," U.C.A., 1953, § 75-35-li(b) 
(Repl. Vol. 8C, 1982, Supp. 1985), by implication the rule 
does not permit the entry of a conditional guilty plea. 
Second, the State argues that the trial court participated in 
the plea agreement, contrary to the prohibitions against such 
conduct in Rule 11(f). The State asserts that both errors 
either require this Court to declare the guilty pleas a 
nullity or allow the trial court to proceed with sentencing 
without regard to the plea agreement. 
We first address the State's argument that Rule 11 
prohibited the trial court from accepting a guilty plea 
conditioned upon an agreement not to impose the death pen-
alty. Assuming arguendo that the State acquiesced in the 
plea agreement,4 nothing in the specific language of the rule 
prohibits a court from accepting or rejecting a plea agreement 
that asks the court to commit itself in advance to imposing a 
sentence lawfully within its power.5 On the other hand, 
Utah's Rule 11 does not explicitly permit a judge to accept a 
guilty plea conditioned upon the imposition of an agreed-upon 
sentence. It is one thing to say that Rule 11 may not con-
template the trial court's acceptance of a guilty plea 
conditioned upon a promise to impose a given sentence, or 
that such a practice is unwise as a general policy, and an 
entirely different thing to say that Utah's Rule 11 posi-
tively forbids it in all situations and that any resulting 
plea is void. 
Some cases under the old version of federal Rule 11 
held that the rule flatly prohibited a trial court from 
accepting a plea when the court made its intention respecting 
sentencing clear prior to acceptance of the plea. See, e.g., 
United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830, 836 (5th Cir. 1981); 
United States v. Werker, supra, 535 F.2d at 201. In these 
cases, however, the courts did not determine whether such a 
plea was automatically a nullity.6 Conversely, some courts 
Tl There is nothing in the record compiled before the trial 
court indicating that the State did not agree to the plea 
agreement. See discussion in part III infra. 
5. In fact, subpart (e)(6), which requires the judge to 
inform the defendant that the judge is not bound by any 
recommendations of the prosecutor as to sentence, implicitly 
recognizes that the judge must be able to exercise broad 
discretion in sentencing. Although subpart (e)(6) insures 
that the prosecutor cannot limit the trial judge's authority 
in sentencing, it does not prohibit the judge from 
independently exercising his discretion to commit himself to 
imposing a particular sentence as a condition of a plea 
agreement. 
6. In Adams, the defendant had withdrawn his plea and 
proceeded to trial. The appeals court held that he was 
(Continued on page 9.) 
held that the acceptance of a guilty plea conditioned upon an 
agreement to impose a particular sentence did not render the 
plea invalid. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 
(1978); United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 
1982)? Toler v. Wyrick, 563 F.2d 372, 374-75 (8th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978). The current version of 
Rule 11 in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
superseded the rule upon which Utah's Rule 11 is modeled, now 
explicitly recognizes that a court may entertain a plea 
bargain conditioned upon an agreement to impose a particular 
sentence, although the court retains the discretion to refuse 
to accept such a plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2), 18 U.S.C. 
(1983). The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 
Justice, discussing a judge's responsibilities when accepting 
a guilty plea, recognizes that it may be both permissible and 
desirable for a judge to disclose a proposed sentence as part 
of the plea-bargaining process, so long as the judge acts as 
a moderator and not as an advocate. Ill ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice § 14-3.3, at 84-85 (2d ed. 1980). 
Utah's Rule 11 provides no such specific guidance. 
Under the circumstances of this case, however, we cannot find 
that the acceptance of the conditional plea was improper. 
The policy considerations that have led some courts to hold 
in specific factual settings that it is improper for a judge 
to agree to impose a given sentence in exchange for the entry 
of a guilty plea are not present in this case. The record 
before us leaves no question that Kay's pleas were volun-
tary. Kay vigorously argues that the pleas were freely and 
knowingly given in an effort to avoid the death penalty. The 
mere fact that Kay pleaded guilty to avoid a harsher penalty 
does not render an otherwise valid plea involuntary. E.g., 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749-50 (1970). As 
noted above, nothing in our Rule 11 explicitly prohibits the 
acceptance of such a conditional plea, and we decline to read 
such a limiting provision into the rule. 
We turn to the State's second contention regarding 
Rule 11. It argues that the trial court's participation in 
the plea discussions rendered the pleas invalid, particularly 
where, as it contends occurred here, the trial court 
negotiated with Kay over the State's objection. Rule 11 
specifically provides that *[t]he judge shall not participate 
in plea discussions prior to any agreement being made by the 
prosecuting attorney . . . .* U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-ll(f) 
(Repl. Vol. 8C, 1982, Supp. 1985). The corresponding federal 
(Footnote 6 continued.) 
entitled to be sentenced by another judge. In Werker, the 
state obtained, upon proper objection and appeal, a writ of 
mandamus to prohibit disclosure of the sentence to the 
defendant. 
rule has always contained a similar provision* Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 11(e)(1), 18 U.S.C. (1983). 
As we previously noted, the trial court's 
participation in plea negotiations is not to be encouraged; 
there is a very real danger that a trial court's partici-
pation will have a coercive effect upon a defendant. 
Certainly, a trial court's unilateral participation in a plea 
negotiation over a prosecutor's objection is highly improper. 
Despite the State's assertions to the contrary, however, 
there is no substantial record evidence that this occurred 
here. While Kay presented his agreement unilaterally to the 
judge, the State's attorneys were present during all discus-
sions on the plea. Nothing in the record suggests that the 
State did not acquiesce in the agreement, nor does any record 
evidence suggest that the judge's actions coerced Kay into 
reluctantly entering the guilty pleas. For these reasons, we 
cannot hold that this violation of Rule 11 requires that the 
plea be declared a nullity. 
A final word on the State's Rule 11 arguments. In 
its zeal to set aside Kay's guilty pleas or renege on the 
bargain that was struck, the State has argued, in effect, 
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty pleas should 
always be voided when the trial court violates any provision 
of Rule 11. The concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall 
and Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well. This position 
is shortsighted, for to follow it would be to sanction a 
remedy far worse than the wrong. If we were to hold that any 
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the resultant plea, 
even when the plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered, we 
would encourage defendants, convicted and sentenced after 
such a plea, to attack their convictions for purely tactical 
reasons, either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas corpus 
long after the fact.7 We have refused to overturn convictions 
upon such challenges in the past, e.g., State v. Knowles, 
Utah, 709 P.2d 311 (1985); State v. Morris, Utah, 709 P.2d 
310 (1985), and we find no reason to encourage such attacks 
in the future. 
Overturning such convictions—which we would have to 
do if we embraced the rationale advanced by the State and the 
Chief Justice's concurring opinion—would require the State 
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably long after the 
challenged guilty pleas were entered and when the passage of 
time would make reprosecution impractical, if not 
TZ No data is available for Utah specifically, but studies 
indicate that despite the proscriptions contained in the 
federal rules and in most state rules, judicial involvement 
in plea bargaining is widespread. Ill ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice § 14-3.3, at 84 (2d ed. 1980). Thus, the 
potential for such attacks is substantial. 
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impossible. Almost certainly, the ultimate result would be 
to free a number of convicted persons for nothing more than 
technical errors in the acceptance of their voluntary guilty 
pleas. 
Having concluded that violations of Rule 11 do not 
automatically invalidate Kay's guilty pleas, the question 
arises as to the consequences of Rule 11 violations* Rule 30 
of Utah's Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A.f 1953, 
§ 77-35-30(a) (Repl. Vol. 8C, 1982), reflects our "harmless 
error" rule, and we find it applicable to situations involv-
ing violations of Rule ll.8 Accordingly, a Rule 11 error 
will not invalidate the plea taken unless the error results 
in a substantial violation of a party's rights. In the 
present case, we find no error that affects the substantial 
rights of a party and, as to which, an objection was timely 
raised. The State certainly had ample grounds for raising 
objections at the time the plea was taken; however, it waived 
those objections by its failure to raise them at the time the 
pleas were accepted. Therefore, the Rule 11 violations 
cannot be a basis for our invalidating the pleas. 
Ill 
We next turn to Kay's arguments concerning his 
rights under a broken plea agreement. Kay first contends 
that any attempt to try him or sentence him without respect-
ing the terms of the plea agreement will violate his rights 
under the state and federal constitutions not to be placed 
twice in jeopardy. Kay relies on the almost universal 
recognition that jeopardy attaches when a court accepts a 
guilty plea, see, e.g., Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 
(1883); Cruz v. United States, 709 F.2d 111, 113 (1st Cir. 
1983), and that the entry of the plea, rather than the actual 
imposition of the sentence, is the critical moment for 
determining jeopardy. See Annot, 75 A.L.R.2d 683; Stowers v. 
State, 266 Ind. 403, 363 N.E.2d 978, 982 (1977). 
8. In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), the 
Supreme Court suggested that any violation of federal Rule 11 
rendered a guilty plea void. Id. at 471-72. The rule was 
thereafter amended to provide that variations from the 
procedures outlined in the rule should be disregarded unless 
the variation affected a defendant's substantial rights. 
Rule 11(h); 11 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1985). The notes of the 
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure state 
that subsection (h) was added to clarify the fact that the 
harmless error provision of Rule 52(a) applied to Rule 11 
violations. We see no reason why the harmless error concept 
should not also apply to Utah's analogue to federal Rule 11. 
A party is no more entitled to a perfect plea proceeding than 
he is to a perfect trial. See Warner v. Morris, Utah, 709 
P.2d 309 (1985) (failure to follow letter of Rule 11 does not 
render plea void). 
The State, in responding to this claim, relies on 
cases that have assumed, without directly addressing the 
question, that the State's failure to adhere to a plea 
bargain does not raise double jeopardy problems because the 
State's noncompliance simply renders the plea void ab initio. 
The apparent reasoning of these cases is that a plea agreement 
based upon a promise which is later broken has been coerced 
and is therefore void. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York# 
404 U.S. 257 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); cf. Machibroda 
v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962). Since jeopardy 
does not attach when a plea is void, these cases reason that 
the defendant may be tried without running afoul of the 
constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. The 
ALI's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures § 350-6 and 
the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure § 444(e)(2)(iii) make 
the same analytic assumption. 
That analysis, however, is not entirely 
satisfactory. In an attempt to avoid freeing defendants who 
plead guilty whenever the prosecutor or a judge later refuses 
to comply with the terms of the plea agreement, these courts 
have resorted to the fiction that the plea never occurred— 
that it is "void ab initio." Yet at the time the plea was 
taken, it certainly may have been knowing and voluntary, and 
under accepted doctrine, nothing more is required to make 
jeopardy attach at the time the plea is entered. This 
approach also has practical flaws. While it permits a 
defendant to be retried, it places no constraints on the 
power of the State or the court to break a plea agree-
ment with impunity. For that reason, the courts have had to 
resort to notions of fundamental fairness under the due 
process clause to construct some necessary protections for 
the defendants' legitimate interests. See part IV, infra. 
The analytical and practical problems posed by the 
void ab initio approach have led some courts to reject it. 
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 119, 121 (8th 
Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976); United States 
v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111, 113 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Holman, 728 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 105 S. 
Ct. 388 (1984); Myers v. Frazier, W. Va., 319 S.E.2d 782 
(1984); cf. People v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash. 2d 579, 564 P.2d 
799 (1977). Because the entry of a plea constitutes a waiver 
by the defendant of a number of important constitutional 
rights, a trial court may not simply disregard a plea agree-
ment unless the defendant knowingly waives his right to be 
free from jeopardy through a voluntary withdrawal of the 
plea. See, e.g., Stowers v. State, supra, 363 N.E.2d at 
982-83. 
In view of the conflict among the lower federal 
courts, the disparate state court positions, and the absence 
of a clear ruling by the United States Supreme Court, we do 
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not feel compelled to adopt the strained void ab initio 
analysis. Rather, we are persuaded by the First Circuit's 
reasoning in United States v. Cruz, supra. In Cruz, the 
trial court unconditionally accepted a defendant's guilty 
plea to a lesser charge, but later rejected the plea based 
upon information it later received in the presentence 
report. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial 
court's rejection of the plea agreement and order that he 
stand trial placed him twice in jeopardy. The First Circuit 
considered the void ab initio analysis and rejected it. It 
also considered the possibility of finding that jeopardy did 
not attach until the sentence was pronounced, but rejected 
that alternative analysis for policy reasons. Finally, it 
settled on what we deem to be the most satisfactory analysis. 
The court recognized that jeopardy attaches at the time the 
guilty plea is accepted. However, it reasoned that nothing 
inherent in the double jeopardy clause analysis forbids the 
trial court from setting aside the plea and forcing the defen-
dant to trial under appropriate circumstances. The Cruz 
court noted that although jeopardy attaches when a jury is 
impaneled, if thereafter a mistrial is properly declared, a 
defendant may still be retried without violating double 
jeopardy. By a parallel of reasoning, the court concluded 
that double jeopardy ought not bar trial of a defendant if a 
guilty plea is set aside for sufficient reasons. Accordingly, 
the court stated: 
[J]eopardy attaches upon acceptance of the 
guilty plea, but [the constitution] 
allow[s] the trial court to rescind its 
acceptance at any time before sentencing 
and judgment upon a showing of "manifest 
necessity"—the standard for declaring a 
mistrial over the defendant's objection. 
709 F.2d at 114.9 
We consider the Cruz court's approach to double 
jeopardy to be sound and not so subject to ad hoc manipu-
lations as the void ab initio analysis that fictionalizes 
coercion from the fact of a breached promise. Furthermore, 
it does not require subsequent resort to due process analysis 
to protect the legitimate interests of a defendant against 
V. The First Circuit speculated that a weaker standard than 
"manifest necessity" might be appropriate where a plea was 
set aside, rather than a trial aborted, because double 
jeopardy considerations are "less implicated" when dealing 
with guilty pleas rather than full-scale trials. However, 
the court did not have to consider this issue in depth 
because it based its decision to reinstate the plea on the 
lower court's direct violation of the federal rule in its use 
of the information in the presentence report. 
13 
capricious action by the court or the prosecution in refusing 
to abide by plea agreements. Cruz acknowledges that plea 
agreements are binding on the parties and the court once the 
plea is entered and accepted. If the court or the prosecutor 
refuses to comply with the terms of the plea thereafter, the 
defendant may choose to withdraw the plea. The trial court 
may not refuse to comply with the terms of the accepted agree-
ment unless circumstances justify the declaration of a 
misplea;10 otherwise, the double jeopardy clause will preclude 
subsequent trial of that defendant. This means, in practice, 
that once the court or prosecution has entered into a plea 
agreement and that plea has been accepted and entered, neither 
one may unilaterally withdraw from the agreement without a 
showing that facts analogous to those warranting a mistrial 
exist (at least in the absence of a breach of the agreement 
by the defendant). This practical constraint should be suffi-
cient to protect against capricious action by the State. At 
the same time, by permitting the declaration of a misplea 
under appropriate circumstances, the legitimate interest of 
the public in assuring that criminal prosecutions are not 
frustrated by a clumsy application of the double jeopardy 
clause is protected. We therefore choose to employ the Cruz 
analysis in considering Kay's federal double jeopardy claim. 
The Cruz analysis also seems appropriate in applying 
the double jeopardy prohibition under article I, section 12 
of the Utah Constitution. There is no Utah case law 
discussing when jeopardy attaches as a result of a guilty 
plea> nor is there any law as to when guilty pleas may be set 
aside without barring retrial; yet these questions are 
appropriately answered by Cruz. Therefore, we apply the 
analysis used in Cruz in considering Kay's claims under 
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, as well as 
under the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Cruz does not deal in depth with the standard that 
should be met to justify setting aside a guilty plea and 
permitting subsequent trial of a defendant. Thus, we must 
10. We recognize that Utah's Rule 11 provides that "if the 
judge [after accepting a plea] decides that final disposition 
should not be handled in conformity with the plea agreement, 
he shall so advise the defendant and then call upon the 
defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea." It may be 
contended that this provision gives a trial judge carte 
blanche to withdraw from a plea bargain at any time. However, 
it is elementary that neither rule nor statute may override a 
defendant's constitutional right not to be placed twice in 
jeopardy. If a court attempted to withdraw from a plea 
agreement over a defendant's objection and in the absence of 
circumstances warranting a misplea, constitutional prohibi-
tions against double jeopardy would preclude his further 
prosecution. 
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determine when the "manifest necessity" standard used in the 
federal courts or the "legal necessity" standard used in the 
Utah courts to determine when a trial judge may properly 
declare a mistrial over a defendant's objection should be 
applied to situations involving guilty pleas.11 
It is generally accepted that a trial court may 
properly declare a mistrial upon its own motion and over a 
defendant's objection when an error occurs which will 
obviously compel reversal if the case is appealed, thus 
making further proceedings futile. See, e.g., Illinois v. 
Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); Arizona v. Washington, 434 
U.S. 497, 505 (1978); State v. Whitman, 93 Utah 2d 557, 74 
P.2d 696 (1973); State v. Ambrose, Utah, 598 P.2d 354 
(1979). Some courts, in determining whether a mistrial 
should be granted, have used a balancing test: the potential 
prejudice to the defendant from granting the mistrial and 
denying him his "valued right to have his trial completed by 
a particular tribunal" is weighed against "the public's 
interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments." 
Wade y. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690 (1949), reh'g denied, 337 
U.S. 921 (1949); State v. Ambrose, supra. This is to guard 
against the prosecu-
tion's inviting a mistrial by committing reversible error 
when it thinks that the case is going poorly and would prefer 
to try again before a new finder of fact. See, e.g., United 
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1971); State v. Ambrose, 
supra. 
The granting of a misplea should be measured by a 
similar standard. It is true, as the Cruz court noted, that 
double jeopardy considerations are not as heavily implicated 
in a plea bargain as in a trial setting. 709 F.2d at 114. 
Nonetheless, in light of the double jeopardy problems, con-
siderations of fundamental fairness permeate the cases 
involving mistrials. Those considerations are equally applic-
able to plea bargains. This is best illustrated by the fact 
that although the courts have erected few obstacles to the 
abrogation of plea bargains under the double jeopardy clause, 
11. The Utah cases have referred to a "legal" or "special" 
necessity for granting a mistrial over a defendant's 
objection, rather than a "manifest" necessity—the phrase-
ology used in the federal courts. Our examination of the 
cases reveals no substantial differences between state and 
federal courts in the standards for granting a mistrial. 
Compare United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580, 22 U.S. 
579 (1824); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1970); 
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978), with State 
v. Thompson, 58 Utah 291, 199 P. 161 (1921); State v. 
Whitman, 93 Utah 2d 557, 74 P.2d 696 (1973); State v. 
Ambrose, Utah, 598 P.2d 354, 358-59 (1979); McNair v. 
Hayward, Utah, 666 P.2d 321, 324 (1983). 
1 R 
they have resorted to the due process clause to accomplish 
the same end. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 
262-63 (1971); United States v. Mack, 655 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 
1981); United States v. Mercer, 691 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1982); 
Stowers v. Statey supra, 363 N.E.2d at 983. Therefore, it 
seems plain that a misplea can properly be granted where 
obvious reversible error has been committed in connection 
with the terms or the acceptance of the plea agreement and no 
undue prejudice to the defendant is apparent. Declaration of 
a misplea also seems reasonable in situations where some 
fraud or deception by one party leads to the acceptance of 
the plea agreement by the other party or the court. There 
may be other circumstances where the balancing of the 
interests and legitimate expectations of the defendant and 
the public will also warrant a misplea, but we need not reach 
that question today. 
Applying the foregoing standard, we do not find that 
the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a misplea 
and ordering Kay either to face sentencing or to withdraw his 
plea of guilty. The trial court found that the conditional 
plea was illegal. As indicated earlier in this opinion, it 
was mistaken on this point. However, Rule 11 certainly was 
violated, and had the prosecution timely objection, those 
violations would have been grounds to set the plea aside. 
The trial court also found that the State had been surprised 
by the proposed plea and had disagreed with it. There is 
little record support for that finding because most of the 
conversation relating to the plea was held off the record. 
However, the trial judge is certainly in a better position 
than we to know whether the prosecution disagreed with the 
proposed agreement. In light of these findings and the 
circumstances discussed below, we conclude that the errors 
committed by all parties provided ample support for the trial 
court's finding of the misplea. 
A brief factual review is warranted. Defendant's 
counsel initiated the series of errors when he proposed a 
plea bargain to the trial court without having first obtained 
the State's consent. Under Rule 11, the plea should not have 
been tendered to the judge unless the State had previously 
agreed to its terms. On the record before us, there is no 
evidence that the prosecutor at any time expressly agreed to 
the terms of the plea, much less that he agreed to the plea 
prior to its presentation to the judge. 
The trial court also erred by entertaining the 
plea. After the motion to enter a plea was presented to it, 
and before proceeding with the in camera hearing, the court 
should have ascertained whether the prosecutor had agreed to 
the proposed plea. If it determined that the prosecutor had 
not agreed in advance, the court should have terminated the 
hearing and any further consideration of the plea. 
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The problems created by defense counsel and the 
trial court were compounded by the prosecution. A timely 
objection by the State would have prompted the judge to stop 
the proceedings and would have obviated the resulting prob-
lems. In the very unlikely event that the judge refused to 
halt the proceeding, the State could have asked for a recess, 
contacted any member of this Court, and obtained a temporary 
stay of the plea proceeding pending procurement of a writ of 
prohibition. See United States v. Werker, supra, 535 F.2d at 
201. The prosecution took none of the steps described. In 
fact, despite its current protestations, its actions at the 
time of the plea and confession suggest that it may have 
acquiesced in the plea bargain, although the trial judge 
seems to have expressly found to the contrary.12 In any 
event, the prosecution's vacillating performance does not 
change our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in declaring a "misplea" and setting the plea 
agreement aside. 
IV 
Finally, we consider Kay's contention that 
considerations of fundamental fairness embodied in the due 
process clause of amendment XIV of the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution require specific enforcement of the plea. He 
argues that he acted in reliance on the promise that he would 
not be sentenced to death if he entered a guilty plea and 
gave a full confession. The confession was given, and 
although it would not be admissible at a subsequent trial, it 
has provided the prosecution with a road map if he should now 
be forced to go to trial. He contends that to require him to 
go to trial under such circumstances would be manifestly 
unfair, especially since he was induced to give the confession 
by the court's broken promise. 
12. While Kay tendered his motion for acceptance of the 
pleas unilaterally, the motion was discussed with the court 
and the State in chambers for over an hour. A recess was 
called, another short in camera proceeding was held with all 
counsel present, and proceedings were then held on the 
record. The State failed to object at any time during the 
record proceedings, despite the trial court's repeated 
inquiries to the State's counsel. The inference that can be 
drawn from this record, and from the State's subsequently 
raising the issue only after a new lead counsel's appearance 
and after defendant's open court confession had thoroughly 
inflamed the public, is that the State initially acquiesced 
in the plea agreement. Although the trial court found that 
the State was surprised by the conditional plea and did not 
agree to it, we are deeply troubled by the prosecution's 
conduct. 
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In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 
(1971)f the Supreme Court expressly recognized that, as a 
matter of due process, a defendant who pleads guilty has a 
constitutional right to a remedy when that agreement is 
broken. However, the Court refused to decide whether the 
appropriate remedy should be withdrawal of the plea or 
specific enforcement, leaving that question for the state 
court to resolve based on the facts of the case. Id. Since 
Santobello, numerous state and federal courts have considered 
the appropriate remedy for a broken plea bargain. When a 
defendant has taken steps in reliance on a plea bargain that 
may prejudice him at a subsequent trial, many courts have 
granted specific enforcement of the plea agreement. See, 
e.g., Santobello v. New York, supra; United States v. Mack, 
655 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Mercer, 691 
F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1982); Unites States v. Blackwell, supra, 
694 F.2d at 1337; Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192 
(9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111 (1st 
Cir. 1983); Stowers v. State, supra, 393 N.E.2d at 983. We 
choose not to follow that route. 
As noted earlier, the Cruz double jeopardy analysis 
can take adequate cognizance of the fundamental fairness 
concerns that are ordinarily brought into play under the due 
process clause in connection with broken plea agreements. 
Those considerations were taken into account in our conclu-
sion that the grant of the misplea was not an abuse of 
discretion. There is no reason to reach a different con-
clusion under the due process clause of either the state or 
the federal constitution. It is true that Kay confessed 
because of the plea agreement. However, that confession 
certainly cannot be used at a subsequent trial since he was 
misled into giving it. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 
220 (1927). This places Kay in no different position than 
any other defendant who gives a confession that is later 
found not to have been knowing and voluntary. The confession 
is excluded, but nothing precludes trial of the defendant. 
The judge at a subsequent trial must assure that the prosecu-
tion makes no use of the confession or any evidence derived 
from it. But the speculative value of a "road map" is not 
enough to preclude prosecution. 
It must be borne in mind that Kay proposed the plea 
and the terms under which it was given. In doing so, he 
acted in violation of Rule 11 and generated a number of the 
ensuing problems. It would be anomolous to hold that because 
he and his counsel were able to draw the court and the 
prosecution into a proceeding in violation of Rule 11, he is 
constitutionally entitled to the benefit of his bargain. 
We have considered Kay's other contentions on appeal 
and find them to be without merit. 
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The case is remanded. Kay may either withdraw the 
guilty pleas that were given as part of the aborted plea 
agreement and enter new pleas or he may choose to stand on 
his guilty pleas and proceed to sentencing under the 
provisions of section 76-3-207 with no guarantee as to 
sentence. 
I CONCUR: 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
HALL, Chief Justice: (Concurring in the result) 
I join the Court in affirming the order of the trial 
court which vacated the condition imposed by the pleas of 
guilty. However, I do not join the Court in its interpre-
tation of the scope of judicial participation in plea 
bargaining. 
Judicial participation in plea bargaining is 
expressly prohibited by Rule 11(f), Utah R. Crim. P.,1 which 
reads in pertinent part as follows: 
(f) The judge shall not participate in 
plea discussions prior to any agreement 
being made by the prosecuting attorney, but 
once a tentative plea agreement has been 
reached which contemplates entry of a plea 
in the expectation that other charges will 
be dropped or dismissed, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the 
disclosure to him of such tentative 
agreement and the reasons therefor in 
advance of the time for tender of the 
plea. The judge may then indicate to the 
prosecuting attorney and defense counsel 
whether he will approve the proposed 
disposition. Thereafter, if the judge 
decides that final disposition should not 
be handled in conformity with the plea 
agreement, he shall so advise the defendant 
and then call upon the defendant to either 
affirm or withdraw his plea. 
(Emphasis added.) 
T. U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-11 (1982 ed.). 
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The foregoing statute does not encompass or 
contemplate a role-change on the part of the judge. On the 
contrary, the statute precludes the judge from becoming a 
plea bargainer, a role wholly inconsistent and in conflict 
with the role exclusively reserved to one who must sit in 
judgment* This concept of the role the judge must play is 
further borne out by subsection (e)(6) of Rule 11. That rule 
provides that if recommendations as to sentence are allowed 
by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally 
that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the 
court. 
Utah's Rule 11 is patterned after Rule 11, Fed. R. 
Crim. P., which has similarly been interpreted as prohibiting 
judicial participation in plea bargaining. In United States 
v. Werkerf2 the court had this to say about the role of the judge in plea bargaining: 
Rule 11 implicitly recognizes that 
participation in the plea bargaining 
process depreciates the image of the trial 
judge that is necessary to public 
confidence in the impartial and objective 
administration of criminal justice. As a 
result of his participation, the judge is 
no longer a judicial officer or a neutral 
arbiter. Rather, he becomes or seems to 
become an advocate for the resolution he 
has suggested to the defendant. 
. . . The Rule is based on the sound 
principle that the interests of justice 
are best served if the judge remains aloof 
from all discussions preliminary to the 
determination of guilt or innocence so 
that his impartiality and objectivity 
shall not be open to any question or 
suspicion when it becomes his duty to 
impose sentence.3 
In State v. Jordan,* the Arizona Supreme Court 
observed that under its rule5 the "court shall not 
participate" in plea negotiations. The court said that the 
sound reason for the rule was that set forth in Werker: that 
a judge who participates in plea bargaining is thereby 
T. 535 F.2d 198 (2nd Cir.)f cert- denied, 429 U.S. 926 
(1976). 
3. Id. at 203. 
4. 137 Ariz. 504, 508-09, 672 P.2d 169, 173-74 (1983). 
5. 17 A.R.S. Ariz. R. Crim. P., Rule 17.-4(a). 
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deprived of judicial status and can no longer perform as a 
neutral arbiter. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-206 provides that one 
"convicted of a capital felony shall be sentenced in accord-
ance with section 76-3-207, and sentence shall be death or 
life imprisonment as the court or jury, in accordance with 
this section, shall determine.* 
Predicated upon the rule that prohibits judicial 
participation in plea bargaining, U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-207(1) 
(Supp. 1985) mandates that a "sentencing proceeding" follow 
the entry of a plea of guilty or conviction of a capital 
felony. That section reads in pertinent part as follows: 
(1) When a defendant has pled guilty 
to or been found guilty of a capital 
felony, there shall be further proceedings 
before the court or jury on the issue of 
sentence. In the case of a plea of guilty 
to a capital felony, the sentencing 
proceedings shall be conducted by the 
court which accepted the plea or by a jury 
upon request of the defendant. . • . 
(2) In these sentencing proceedings, 
evidence may be presented as to any matter 
the court deems relevant to sentence, 
including but not limited to the nature 
and circumstances of the crime, the 
defendant's character, background, 
history, mental and physical condition, 
and any other facts in aggravation or 
mitigation of the penalty. 
(Emphasis added.) 
It does not lie within the prerogative of the court 
to disregard the mandate of a sentencing hearing. The court 
is required to consider the evidence to determine whether the 
penalty to be imposed is that of death or life imprisonment. 
Furthermore, agreeing to be bound to impose a life sentence 
in advance of a sentencing hearing constitutes prejudgment of 
the issue of sentencing. It is an arbitrary and injudicious 
act which violates the holding in Furman v. Georgia^ that the 
decision to impose the death penalty shall not be left to the 
uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries. 
In light of the explicit statutory procedures to be 
followed in capital felony cases, it clearly appears that the 
defendant led the trial judge into error by engaging him in a 
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
unilateral plea bargain arrangement whereby pleas of guilty 
were exchanged for a promise of life imprisonment. The mani-
fest error rendered the guilty pleas void ab initio and not 
merely voidable. The court was without power to accept the 
conditional pleas. The pleas were therefore void and without 
legal effect. The pleas were not binding, and either party 
was free to withdraw from them. Consequently, the acceptance 
of the pleas did not place the defendant in jeopardy within 
the meaning of the sixth amendment to the United States 
Constitution or article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Not having been placed in jeopardy, the 
defendant may be tried on the charges to which the void pleas 
were entered. Of course, on remand, defendant has the option 
of proceeding with a sentencing hearing or standing trial on 
reinstated pleas of not guilty. 
The main opinion boldly asserts, without 
documentation, that judicial involvement in plea bargaining 
is widespread in this jurisdiction. I am not so persuaded, 
particularly because no such instances of judicial impro-
priety have surfaced in any of the cases previously decided 
by this Court. However, even assuming that such impropriety 
is indeed prevalent, I deem it far more appropriate to 
squarely meet the issue rather than sanction the practice as 
"harmless error" and simply hope that the evil will go away. 
STEWART, Justice: (Concurring in result and concurring in 
the opinion in part) 
I concur in Parts I and II of the plurality opinion, 
and I concur in the result of the opinion but on somewhat 
different grounds. The key question in this case is not the 
validity of the defendant's plea of guilty, but the 
enforceability of the condition attached to the plea. The 
trial judge made an agreement with the defendant that he 
would plead guilty to a capital homicide charge and in return 
the trial judge would sentence the defendant to life 
imprisonment, a lawful sentence in a capital homicide case. 
The trial judge has now reneged on that agreement and given 
the defendant the choice of either withdrawing his guilty 
plea and pleading not guilty or of standing on his plea of 
guilty and going to a penalty hearing to determine whether he 
will be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The 
defendant seeks to have the Court direct the trial court to 
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment pursuant to the 
terms of the agreement. 
The issue is whether due process requires the trial 
court to perform the agreement and sentence the defendant to 
life imprisonment. In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 
262 (1971), the Supreme Court held with respect to a plea 
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bargain broken by the government that it is for the state 
courts to determine whether a defendant is entitled to 
specific enforcement of the plea bargain or whether he is 
only entitled to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial on 
the crime charged• 
In the instant case the condition attached to the 
defendant's guilty plea was proposed by the defendant, not 
the prosecutor or the trial judge. Although it was the 
defendant who was the prime mover in the whole affair, the 
prosecution clearly acquiesced in the agreement, at least as 
far as the record shows. Nevertheless, I submit that the 
trial judge's decision to refuse to enforce the condition of 
the plea was not error in these circumstances. Rule 11 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states that even after a 
plea bargain has been accepted by the court, "if the judge 
decides that final disposition should not be handled in 
conformity with the plea agreement, he shall so advise the 
defendant and thus call upon the defendant to either affirm 
or withdraw his plea." A number of reasons justify giving 
the trial judge such discretion up to the time of sentence. 
But after sentence has been pronounced, the trial judge may 
not then rescind the sentence, absent fraud or failure of the 
defendant to abide by the terms of the agreement. I do not 
believe that this rule violates the Due Process Clause under 
the ruling in Santobello, at least on the facts of this 
case. 
If the defendant withdraws his guilty plea, as he 
may do under the trial court's order, he waives his right 
against double jeopardy and is no worse off than he was 
before he sought to protect himself from the death penalty by 
his aborted plea bargain, except that he has given a 
confession, which, for reasons explained by Justice 
Zimmerman, is not, in my view, prejudicial. 
HOWE, Justice: (Concurring in the Result) 
I concur in the result. While I agree with much of 
the "misplea" analysis of the majority opinion, I prefer to 
rest my concurrence on the ground that Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure does not authorize a plea 
agreement between the defendant and the judge concerning the 
sentence to be imposed. Subsections (e)(6) and (f) of that 
rule provide: 
(e)(6) If it appears that the 
prosecuting attorney or any other party 
has agreed to request or recommend the 
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other 
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charges, the same shall be approved by the 
court. If recommendations as to sentence 
are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any 
recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
(f) The judge shall not participate 
in plea discussions prior to an agreement 
being made by the prosecuting attorney, 
but once a tentative plea agreement has 
been reached which contemplates entry of a 
plea in the expectation that other charges 
will be dropped or dismissed, the judge, 
upon request of the parties, may permit 
the disclosure to him of such tentative 
agreement and the reasons therefore in 
advance of the time for tender of the 
plea. A judge may then indicate to the 
prosecuting attorney and defense counsel 
whether he will approve the proposed 
disposition. Thereafter, if the judge 
decides that final disposition should not 
be handled in conformity with the plea 
agreement, he shall so advise the 
defendant and then call upon the defendant 
to either affirm or withdraw his plea. 
It is to be noted that these subsections authorize 
only plea agreements between the prosecution and the 
defendant for the entry of a plea to a lesser included 
offense in the expectation that other charges will be dropped 
or dismissed. There is nothing in the language of the 
subsections which would authorize a plea agreement with the 
prosecution or the judge based on the sentence to be 
imposed. To the contrary, subsection (e)(6) states that if 
in the disclosure to the court, a recommendation as to 
sentencing appears, the court shall advise the defendant 
personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
The agreement made by the trial judge here to impose 
a life sentence is not authorized by Rule 11 and thus is not 
enforceable by either the defendant or the court. Further-
more, even if the agreement were authorized, the last 
sentence of Rule 11(f) gives the judge the right to rescind 
his approval of it before sentencing. Thus, I conclude that 
the judge was free to withdraw from the agreement prior to 
the time that sentencing was actually pronounced. Due 
process, however, demands that the defendant who was lead 
into pleading guilty upon the sentencing agreement of the 
judge now be allowed to withdraw his plea should he so 
desire. United States v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 
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(S.D.N.Y. 1966). Should the defendant elect to do so, the 
trial court can take such prophylactic measures as are 
necessary to afford the defendant a fair trial untainted by 
knowledge of the making and withdrawal of the guilty plea. 
This result, i.e., that the agreement is 
unenforceable (but not void) and that the trial judge may 
withdraw from any promise made as to sentencing before 
sentencing is actually pronounced, will not result in the 
mischief feared by the majority opinion. A defendant who has 
been sentenced in accordance with a judge's plea agreement 
has no complaint. He has received the benefit of an executed 
agreement and would not be freed for nothing more than 
technical errors. The trial judge here was fortunate to have 
detected his error before sentencing and should be allowed to 
withdraw from his commitment provided he restores the 
defendant to his original position without prejudice. 
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APPENDIX B 
C. THE APPROPRIATE RELIEF IS TO AFFIRM THE LOWER 
COURT'S ORDER VACATING THE CONDITION OF 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS, AND TO REQUIRE 
REMEDIAL MEASURES TO ENSURE THE DEFENDANT 
A FAIR TRIAL OR THE STATE A FAIR CAPITAL 
SENTENCING PROCEEDING. 
Defendant's request for the relief of "specific 
performance" of the condition of his guilty plea based upon contract 
theories such as detrimental reliance, expressed and mutual promises, 
breach of contract, etc. is meritless. The State certainly was not 
privy to any contract. And if the judge is viewed as the other 
contracting party, its action in entering into the contract was 
unlawful per ££. under the previously cited authorities. Defendant 
created, the error by proposing a contract that was void ah initio. 
At best, he detrimentally relied on his own illegal plea which he 
unilaterally created, proposed and filed. 
The appropriate relief in this case is an affirmance of the 
lower court's order vacating the condition of the plea, coupled with 
suitable prophylactic measures to ensure the defendant and the State 
fair proceedings as the case proceeds either to trial or sentencing. 
To this end the State asks that this Court direct that a new judge 
hear all future proceedings on this case. The State has twice 
suggested and once formally petitioned for the recusal of the present 
district judge due to the events which have transpired (TR. 9/12/84, 
29, 81-82; R.III, 29). To date, he has not recused himself or 
directed a recusal hearing before another judge. Be has been recused 
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from hearing the co-defendant's companion case (State v. Newstead. 
Pifth District Court Crim. No. 997). 
The case authority previously cited makes clear that a 
trial judge's impermissible involvement in the plea bargaining 
process so taints the proceedings that the judge is effectively 
unable to continue on the case. The perception of judicial 
neutrality and the maintenance of public confidence in the 
proceedings is paramount, and the mere appearance of judicial 
impartiality is normally sufficient for recusal, in re Murchison. 
349 U.S. 133 (1955); Haslam v. Morrison. 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520 
(1948); State v. Byington. 114 Utah 388, 200 P.2d 723, 726, 5 A.L.R. 
1393 (1948); cf. 28 U.S.C.S. S§ 144, 455 as construed in United 
States v. Gigayr 605 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1979) (test for recusal is 
whether the circumstances are such as to create in the mind of a 
reasonable man a suspicion of partiality even though no actual bias 
on prejudice exists). 
in United States v. Werker, jsjiBia, 535 F.2d at 204, the 
reviewing court suggested that where plea offers involving judges 
break down and the case goes to trial, "the question then arises 
whether the judge should preside at trial," he being "steeped in the 
knowledge of ttlhe defendant's] guilt." Id. at 204. The court 
concluded that "lulnder such circumstances many judges would feel 
that they should recuse themselves from presiding at the trial." Id. 
Similarly, the courts in United States v. Adams. 634 F.2d 
830 (5th Cir. 1981) and People v. Clark. Colo, 515 P.2d 1243 (1973), 
after condemning conditional pleas of guilty with judges or similar 
impermissible judicial involvement in the plea bargaining process, 
ordered that further proceedings on remand be before a new judge. 
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The present posture of the instant casef being a capital 
one, presents even far more compelling reasons for recusal than 
existed in any of the above-cited cases. Due to the developments 
surrounding the taking of the conditional pleas, the defendant's 
confession relative thereto, the court's subsequent vacating of the 
condition originally attached to such plea, as well as other events 
which have since transpired, it is virtually certain that should the 
case proceed to penalty before this judge, the guilty pleas 
themselves will later be challenged on appeal. In order to safeguard 
and ensure the voluntariness and validity of such pleas, and to 
dissipate the taint of any promise, express or implied, regarding the 
sentence which defendant might receive, it is absolutely imperative 
that the case be handled from this point by another judge, who would 
be entirely independent and removed from all prior representations 
and proceedings. Only after being fully informed that a penalty 
hearing would proceed before a different judge will this defendant's 
decision to stand upon his former pleas rather than to withdraw them-
be deemed wholly voluntary and made with full knowledge of potential 
consequences. The defendant's decision on whether to stand on his 
pleas at this point could well be contingent on whether he feels he 
will be sentenced by the judge whom he alleges is contractually 
obligated to sentence him to life or by a judge with whom he can 
claim no such prior agreement. 
The lower court is essentially in a no-win situation if it 
proceeds to sentencing. If evidence presented at the penalty hearing 
persuades the judge to sentence the defendant to death,"serious 
appellate concerns will be built into the record, injecting into the 
appellate process a substantial issue which can and should be avoided 
by proper prophylactic measures at this point in the proceedings. 
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Iff on the other hand, the present judge hears the penalty 
phase evidence and sentences the defendant to lifer serious problems 
still remain. First, as mentioned above, a challenge can still lie 
as to the validity of the pleas themselves, having arguably been 
induced pursuant to an express condition that defendant not receive 
the death penalty. Notwithstanding the lower court's later order 
t 
vacating such condition, where the same judge sits at the penalty 
phase, there is no way to effectively dissipate the taint of the 
prior judicial involvement. Note that U.C.A. S 77-35-11 specifically 
mandates that where plea bargain with the prosecution includes a 
recommendation as to sentence, "the court shall advise the defendant 
personally that any recommendation as to sentencing is not binding on 
the court." Where a sentencing arrangement has previously been made, 
not with the prosecution, but with the judge himself, nothing short 
of recusal and the substitution of a completely independent and 
detached judge will re-establish the proper neutral posture of the 
sentencing authority. 
Secondly, it is virtually certain should the lower court 
hand down life sentences that public doubts will be raised as to 
whether it was in part or in whole the product of the prior agreement 
rather than a truly independent judicial decision. See state v. 
Jordan, Ariz., 672 P.2d 169 (1983). In order to avoid the situation 
where the court, although acting in good faith, will be perceived to 
have been improperly influenced, an independent judge who will not be 
subject to such public suspicion should sit and determine penalty. 
The State has additional concerns. At the August 22nd 
hearing, the defendant gave a statement under oath regarding his 
involvement in the homicides. Such statement, being in the context 
of a plea rather than of a trial or penalty hearing, was taken to 
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establish a factual basis for the plea and was thus without cross-
examination by the State. The possibility of the lower court 
considering this statement in mitigation of the death penalty is 
clearly present, yet to do so would be a consideration of matters 
outside the penalty hearing record. The defendant could choose not 
to*1 take the stand at the penalty proceedings and effectively insulate 
himself from cross-examination by the State on the content of his 
prior statement. Statements (or "confessions11) given in the context 
of a plea are suspect, and often self-serving. It is difficult to 
assess whether the statement was accurate or whether defendant was 
simply mouthing what he thought necessary to obtain the benefit of 
the conditional pleas. In such situations reviewing courts have 
found that the inducements regarding sentencing render such 
statements questionable at best. In People v. Earegood. Mich., 162 
N.W.2d 802 815 n.19 (1968), the court noted: 
"The defendant Earegood described his 
acts of participation in the crime before 
the judge accepted his plea of guilty to the 
reduced offense. . . . Those statements may 
have been accurate; on the other hand, they may 
have been made in order to justify the trial 
judge in accepting the plea. . . . 
Id. at 815. 
The argument is all the more compelling in a capital case. 
No stronger inducement can be contemplated than the prospect of 
saving one's own life, and statements given specifically conditioned 
so as to avoid the punishment of death can scarcely be considered to 
demonstrate candor, remorse, a clean breast, or anything else in 
defendant's favor. Yet, if the present judge remains on this case, 
the prior statement, without benefit of impeachment, could be 
considered in mitigation. The delicate balancing process of weighing 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in any capital sentencing 
proceeding provided for in D.C.A. S 76-3-207 (1953), as amended, has 
been so compromised in this case as to require an alternate 
sentencing authority to sit at any penalty hearing. 
In the interest of sound administration of justice, this 
case must proceed from this point before a different judge.12 
12 
A separate ground for recusal is that the district judge, at a 
hearing in open court, publicly expressed its unequivocal opinion that 
one of the State's witness, Renada Pasqua, had lied in her testimony 
before the court at a prior hearing (TR. 9/19/84, 10-11). He not only 
expressed his opinion that her testimony was unworthy of belief, but 
that he felt she should be prosecuted for her involvement in the 
crime. 
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